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Chapter 3  Digital Games as Cultural Industry 
 
Journalists have written many books on the digital games industry. Some of these 
books focus on one company, for example, (Sheff 1993; Asakura 2000; Takahashi 
2002) while, as we saw in the last chapter, others provide a very broad historical 
account (Herz 1997; Poole 2000; Wolf 2001; Kent 2002). Although useful, these texts 
do not provide us with an understanding of the structure of the industry, the 
relationships between the main players and the relationship between the games 
industry and other industries. In addition, very little attention is given games for 
emergent platforms like mobile phones, the internet and digital television. 
 
This chapter begins by situating digital games both conceptually and statistically 
within the wider economic and media environment. It considers how digital games 
might fit into what is commonly known within media studies as the cultural industries 
and analyses the growing economic significance of the global games industry as 
compared with other cultural industries in major markets. It then moves on to examine 
the structure of the digital games industry and its key sub-sectors. Finally, the chapter 
examines two important trends in the industry, namely vertical integration and 
licensing.  
 
This chapter adopts a theoretical perspective known as political economy, which was 
introduced in the introduction. Political economy differs quite fundamentally from 
orthodox economic theory. While there are different theoretical traditions within 
political economy, in general it is characterised by its holistic approach (which sees 
the economy not as separate from, but fundamentally linked to political, social and 
cultural processes) and its historical perspective. Mosco (1996:25) notes that a 
political economy of the media studies the structure and social relations which 
constitute the production, distribution and consumption of symbolic goods and is 
particularly concerned with the extent to which these social relationships may be 
unequal. Garnham (2000:39) argues that political economy focuses on how power 
operates in the capitalist system and its ‘effect on the structure and performance of the 
media system and on the relation between the producers and consumers of culture.’ In 
this chapter a political economic perspective is applied to highlight the contested 
relationship between development companies, independent publishers and hardware 
manufacturers/publishers and to explore the impact that increasing vertical integration 
and licensing is having on the ability of new entrants to enter the industry and on the 
diversity of games produced.  
 
The Digital Games Industry as Cultural Industry 
 
The term ‘cultural industry’ originated as a critical and political term and was used to 
highlight the industrialisation of culture in the USA in the 1940s (Adorno and 
Gurevitch 1977; Adorno and Horkheimer 1979). For these writers the industrialisation 
of culture was the opposite of what culture was meant to do. They believed that 
culture was meant to offer a critique of everyday life and the prevailing political and 
economic system, not be a fundamental part of it. Over time the concept of the 
‘cultural industry’ has become pluralized and the focus now is not so much on the fact 
that industrialisation and commodification in themselves are a bad thing but rather on 
the ways through which the capitalist system structures and influences the products 
that get produced. Within political economy of the media the ‘cultural industries’ 
signifies those institutions which are directly involved in the production, distribution 
and circulation of meanings via symbolic forms. With the increasing diversity of 
information industries even this definition may now be too imprecise. However, in 
media studies, and in this book, the core cultural industries refer to the traditional 
media industries of television, radio, books, newspapers, magazines, film and music 
as well as the newer media industries of the internet and, I would argue, digital games. 
Advertising, marketing and education are also usually included (Garnham 2000; 
Hesmondhalgh 2002).  
 
Can the digital games industry be conceptualised as a cultural industry? Any attempt 
to define the digital games industry as a cultural industry must attend to the key 
features which have traditionally been seen to characterise the cultural industries and 
describe how these features operate in the digital games industry. From a political 
economy perspective three features are especially pertinent in this context: the high 
risk involved in cultural production, the high production costs but low reproduction 
costs of cultural products and the semi-public good nature of cultural products and 
services (Preston 2001:231; Hesmondhalgh 2002:17). Broadly speaking the cultural 
industries have developed a number of strategies to respond to these features and 
when one analyses these strategies one begins to find a number of similarities between 
the traditional cultural industries and the digital games industry.  
 
Only a small number of cultural products make a profit. These small numbers of ‘hits’ 
must cover the production costs of a large number of products which fail to make a 
profit. The primary reason for this level of risk is that consumer tastes in cultural 
commodities are driven by irrational factors like fashion and style more than need, 
and are thus highly unpredictable. A related reason stems from the status of cultural 
products as information and has to do with the fact that audiences need to sample an 
information good before they can decide if they want to buy it or not. In order to cope 
with these consumption uncertainties major cultural corporations produce a large 
repertoire or portfolio of products using a number of formulae that communicate 
clearly to the audience what they can expect from a product.  
 
For example, in the film industry the production of films in easily identifiable genres 
serves as one formula which signals to the audience what type of pleasure they can 
expect from a particular film (see Chapter Two). The use of ‘stars’, ‘serials’ and 
‘trailers’ are other strategies which attempt to reduce risk and thus overcome the high 
rate of failure. Similar strategies are evident in the digital games industries. It is 
estimated that only 3 percent of digital games make a profit and in an effort to 
introduce some similarity and predictability to the production process publishers tend 
to commission games which fall into particular generic categories, as in the film 
industry. Another response has been to attach a license to a game which means that 
‘intellectual properties’ from other media, or the real world, are used to create or ‘pre-
figure’ certain expectations in the market. We will explore this strategy in more detail 
later in this chapter. In addition, successful games increasingly spawn sequels, tie-ins 
and merchandise. Finally, as in the film and television industries, the digital games 
industry circulates playable demos and screenshots, especially through game 
magazines and websites, in advance of a game’s release in order to communicate to 
their consumers the key features of a new product.  
 
Secondly, within the cultural industries the relative costs of production are very high 
when compared to the relative reproduction costs. For example, to produce a film 
master and to market that film is very expensive when compared to the relatively 
cheap costs of reproducing multiple copies of that film. In order to recoup these 
production costs cultural industries have a strong incentive to maximise their audience 
and this translates today into a search for global markets, a desire to distribute the 
product across as many media as possible and a desire to control distribution 
channels. Analysis of the Hollywood film industry highlights the importance, for 
example, of overseas markets to that industry and the extent to which the film industry 
depends on broadcast television, DVD and video rental and retail for revenue (Wasko 
1994; Hesmondhalgh 2002:187-189). Similarly within digital games a PC or console 
gold master can cost $3-10 million to produce and the same again to market. However 
the reproduction costs of a game on CD are minimal and thus digital game publishers 
work to maximise global sales and to ‘port’ their games from one platform to another. 
Interestingly, this feature does not hold true for the entire field of digital games as a 
subscription based online game incurs ongoing production costs. Nevertheless it 
applies to the vast majority of games which are sold on CD or cartridge through 
standard retail outlets.  
 
Throughout the cultural industries there is a strong tendency to integrate vertically and 
horizontally in order to control costs and ensure access to as wide a set of distribution 
channels as possible. Doyle (2002:22) defines horizontal integration as ‘when two 
firms at the same stage in the supply chain or who are engaged in the same activity 
combine forces’ while vertical integration is expansion ‘either forward into 
succeeding stages or backward into preceding stages in the supply chain.’ A third 
form of expansion is diagonal integration whereby ‘firms diversity into new business 
areas.’ In the film and broadcast industries in many countries regulators have stepped 
in to control the extent to which companies are vertically integrated. The trend 
towards vertical, horizontal and diagonal integration is also evident in the digital 
games industry where publishers, in particular, are vertically integrating both 
upstream with developers and downstream with distribution companies as well as 
buying other publishers. In addition publishers are increasingly operating across 
gaming platforms and sectors, from PC to console and mobile. Companies like 
Vivendi also operate across a range of other media and non-media sectors. Vertical 
integration in particular will be examined in more detail towards the end of the 
chapter.  
 
Finally, to define a cultural product as a public good is to point to the fact that it is not 
destroyed during use and can be reused by others who may not have to pay for it. This 
is a feature of many knowledge products, as Machlup (1984) noted. However, it does 
cause clear problems for producers in terms of how they are to recoup their 
investment in terms of creating the original, and costly, product. While the 
dissemination and copying of a cultural product may be almost costless, certainly its 
original production is not. This characteristic gave rise to the development of 
‘intellectual property rights’ and ‘copyright’ which are monopoly rights afforded to a 
producer in return for their investment and effectively turn public goods into private 
goods (Garnham, 2000:58). The traditional cultural industries developed complicated 
ticketing, payment and collection systems and began to rely on advertising revenues 
to ensure production costs were covered. While there are marginal costs and increased 
returns involved in sales in the digital games industry, as in the print industry, the 
industry has also developed both technological and institutional solutions which 
attempt to ensure that the publisher and the developer receive payment for their 
investment. There is a constant battle against piracy and hackers in the digital games 
industry although recent examples whereby the source code for Half-Life 2 (2004) 
was stolen and the Xbox and the N-Gage encryption systems were hacked illustrate 
that these solutions are not entirely secure.  
 
Estimating the economic value of the digital games industry 
 
While clearly the digital games industry displays many of the characteristics of other 
cultural industries how does it compare economically? Constructing an accurate 
picture of the size of the global games industry in terms of software and hardware 
sales is a difficult task as estimates vary widely and do not remain accurate for long. 
Government, consultancy and press reports usually fail to give a global perspective on 
the industry and indeed often offer contradictory information depending on their 
particular agenda. This section explores data commissioned by the publisher 
associations the Entertainment Software Association (ESA) in the USA, the 
Entertainment and Leisure Software Publishers Association (ELSPA) in the UK as 
well as government reports from the UK, Japan and South Korea.1  
 
While there have been dramatic collapses in the digital games industry over the past 
thirty years, particularly the 1983 crash in the USA, statistics over the past ten years 
point to a steady growth in digital game sales, both in monetary and unit terms, across 
all platforms. The rate of overall growth across all sectors of the industry is crucially 
tied into the console lifecycle and thus just before the launch of a new generation of 
platforms, roughly every five years, the rate of overall growth in the industry slows as 
consumers wait in anxious anticipation of the new platforms and games. Indeed in 
2000 the overall value of retail sales shrank slightly and in 2001 remained weak with 
growth of only 7 percent (Deutsche Bank 2002:10). By 2002 the launch of the PS2, 
the GameCube and the Xbox was having an impact on overall sales and this continued 
until the end of 2004 when the market slowed in anticipation of the next generation of 
consoles (DataMonitor 2002; DFC Intelligence 2004). In the first quarter of 2005 
console game sales in the US remained around 7 percent but overall sales in the 
games market in the US grew by 23 percent driven by handheld hardware sales 
following the launch of Nintendo’s DS and Sony’s PSP (NPD Group 2005).  
 
While hardware and software are intimately tied in this industry it is useful to just 
look at software sales. A UK government report published in 2002 suggested that the 
global ‘leisure software’ industry in 2000 was worth approximately £13bn of which 
almost £10bn was accounted for by games software (Spectrum Strategy Consultants 
2002:10). Within this total the USA was the largest market with 35 percent of total 
sales, followed by Europe with 31.5 percent and then Japan with 18.5 percent. These 
figures are largely corroborated by figures published by Deutsche Bank in 2001 but 
this report estimated that the USA accounted for 40 percent of total sales followed by 
Japan at 33 percent and Europe at 26 percent. A third source estimated that total 
games software sales in 2001 were worth $17.7bn and indicated that the largest 
market was the Asia Pacific market with sales of $7.6bn in 2001 (DataMonitor 2002).  
 
A more recent report estimate that the global games industry was worth $27 billion in 
2002 of which two thirds was accounted for by software. It expected the industry to 
decline somewhat in 2005 and then to accelerate to reach $30 billion by 2010 (Forfás 
2004:2). Another report estimated the industry to be worth $21 billion in 2003, 
although it is not clear is this figure includes hardware or not (OECD 2004). A third 
source estimated that the global interactive software market was worth $18.2 billion in 
2003 (Screen Digest 2004). The last three references draw upon consultancy reports to 
which this author did not have full access and so they are used with caution. It is not 
clear for example to what extent wireless/mobile games are included or revenues for 
Asian markets. For industrial strategists, policy makers and academics the lack of 
independent and affordable data on the digital games industry makes strategic 
planning and rigorous analysis with other industrial sectors difficult. 
 
Table 3-1 Value of Global Software and Hardware Sales. 
(Billions of $) 
 
 Software 
sales  
Hardware, 
software and 
peripherals 
Sources  
2002 18 billion 27 billion Forfás 2004 report which 
draws on data from a variety 
of consultancy reports. 
2003 21 billion  OECD 2004 report which 
draws upon a variety of 
sources. 
2003 18.2 billion  Screen Digest report. 
Introduction available on the 
web. Figure refers to 
interactive leisure software 
which is broader than games.  
 
So how big is an industry, which generates around $18 billion annually in software 
sales? These figures become more meaningful when we compare them to sales figures 
for other cultural industries. Unfortunately, there is no source which collates this data 
on a global scale but figures for the USA from a variety of trade associations provide 
an interesting basis for comparison. The Entertainment Software Association in the 
US and the National Purchase Diary (NPD) Group, a consultancy based in New York, 
estimates that total sales of video and computer game software in 2004 generated $7.3 
billion and when hardware and accessories are added the total comes in at just under 
$10 billion. By comparison, domestic box office in 2004 in the USA generated $9.5 
billion (MPAA 2004). Interestingly, while growth in the digital games industry has 
been fairly steady over the past five years, growth in US box office and the domestic 
recorded music sales has been almost nil and declining respectively since 2001 as new 
formats emerge (ESA 2004; OECD 2004). Meanwhile growth in DVD sales has been 
accelerating and one source estimated that US consumers spent $15.5 billion on 
DVDs and a further $5.7 billion on renting DVDs (DEG 2004). This figure does not 
include sales of DVD players. 
 
Figure 3-1 Sales of US Entertainment Media, 2004 
(billions of $) 
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Sources: Entertainment Software Association, National Purchase Diary, Motion 
Picture Association of America, Digital Entertainment Group. Accessed May 2005.  
 
The figure for ‘total game sales’ is often used to suggest that the digital games 
industry earns more revenue than the film industry. Indeed the claim is made so often 
in the popular press and game magazines that it demands closer investigation. What 
these comparisons usually fail to point out is that ‘total game sales’ includes sales of 
game hardware, accessories and leisure software, which is a very broad category of 
products. When we compare game software sales only to content only sales in other 
sectors we get a more accurate picture. In addition, these comparisons often fail to 
explain that cinema receipts or box office form only a small percentage of the total 
revenues made by a film. Indeed box office receipts only account for 25 percent of the 
total revenue of a film and typically video and DVD sales/rentals, network and cable 
TV and pay-per-view are all important additional sources of revenue (Deutsche Bank 
2002:29).  
 
While these sales figures provide one means of comparing the economic value of 
digital games to other cultural industries, another way is to consider how digital 
games compare to other media in terms of monthly consumer expenditure. The 
MPAA in the USA found that in 2001 consumers spent most on television, with home 
video and books coming in second and third. Games were included in a category with 
interactive television and cinema box office and came fourth.2 By comparison a 
survey of monthly expenditure by 1,000 people in Japan in 2002 on leisure activities 
found that people spent most on mobile phone fees, followed by Internet connection 
fees and then videogame software. Fees for mobile phone and internet of course 
would include payment for accessing online games. Books, magazines and comics 
came a close fourth (CESA 2002). Interestingly spend per capita was greatest for 
DVDs, followed by mobile phone connection fees and videogame software. This 
reflects the slightly higher prices spent by lower numbers of people on these media.  
 Figure 3-2 Average Monthly Expenditure on Leisure Activities, Japan, 2002 
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The various figures and tables in this section have provided us with a lot of data. To 
summarise briefly it would appear that while the digital games industry is growing in 
economic terms it is still not as large in total value terms as some other cultural 
industries and total sales are vulnerable to changes in hardware particularly in the 
console and handheld sub-sectors. Growth in the industry is nevertheless steady (4-8 
percent per annum) and while this is impressive compared with cinema box office 
receipts in the US since 2001, it should also be measured against the growth of new 
emerging media formats to give perspective. Finally, the amount spent by people per 
month on digital games is dwarfed by what they spend on television, home video and 
books in the USA and by the mobile phone and the Internet in Japan.  
 
The Structure of the Games Industry 
Different Market Segments 
 
Total sales figures tend to hide very interesting dynamics in different sub-sectors of 
segments of the digital games industry. Williams (2002) divides the games industry 
into three market segments according to the main hardware platforms: consoles, 
handhelds and personal computer (PC) and argues that each have their own 
underlying dynamics. Such a segmentation is applied widely in industry reports and in 
terms of sales, console games currently dwarf games sold for other platforms and 
constitute anywhere from 57 to 78 percent of total global software sales (DataMonitor 
2002; Deutsche Bank 2002; Spectrum Strategy Consultants 2002). At present the 
main consoles are Sony’s PlayStation 2 (PS2), Microsoft’s Xbox and Nintendo’s 
Gamecube (GC). Some reports group games for handhelds such as the GameBoy 
Advance (GBA), with the other console platforms.   
 
Figure 3-3 Global Software Sales by Platform, 2001 
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Source: Deutsche Bank (2002) 
 
Interestingly, not all markets demonstrate the same affinity with console games. 
While console games dominate in Japan, with almost 94 percent of total sales, this 
falls to 80 percent in the USA and 55 percent in Europe (Spectrum Strategy 
Consultants 2002:10; ESA 2003). Europe is by far the largest market for sales of PC 
games, at 47 percent, followed by the USA at 35 percent (Spectrum 2002:11). Sales of 
games on other platforms form only a small proportion of total revenues currently. 
However, the Spectrum report estimates that the mobile games market in Europe, the 
USA and Japan was worth £73m in 2001, with Japan constituting over 50 percent of 
this total (2002:15). They predicted that the mobile games market would double in 
value to 2005 and that the online games market would grow from £0.5bn in 2001 to 
£0.89bn in 2005. Other sources claim that online gaming will increase dramatically as 
broadband becomes more widely available, and point to the growth of online games in 
South Korea where broadband penetration is very high and online games constitute 
over 60 percent of the total domestic game market (KGDI 2004). It is anticipated that 
the next generation of consoles from late 2005 will all incorporate online capabilities. 
 
In what remains of this section we will develop a slightly different market 
segmentation of the digital games industry. This segmentation takes games 
themselves, or what we might call the software aspect of the industry, rather than 
hardware as its starting point. Table 3-2 differentiates between four game segments: 
console games, standard PC games, massively multiplayer online games (MMOGs) 
and mini games.4 There are two reasons why this segmentation makes sense. Firstly, 
while sales of console, handheld and PC games are the most significant in terms of 
sales at the moment (see Figure 3-2) it is clear that other segments are emerging 
which offer alternative business models, new types of games and are attracting new 
types of gamers. Many industry reports offer only scant attention to these segments. 
Secondly, a hardware based segmentation is unsatisfactory given the tendency for 
hybrid and new platforms to emerge at relatively regular intervals. The development 
of MMOGs, for example, currently combines online capabilities with PC platforms to 
produce a new market segment with unique characteristics which are different from 
other types of multiplayer online PC and console games. Mini games like PC web 
downloadable games and puzzle/card games are currently played on personal 
computers, mobile phones, digital televisions and handhelds.5 The development of 
systems like Infinium’s Phantom, which will be able to play a variety of game types, 
suggests that platform based segmentations may become redundant. 
 
Table 3-2 gives examples of games in these four market segments and further outlines 
how the segments differ along the following four economic and industrial dimensions: 
1. Market concentration – monopoly, oligopoly or numerous companies2. The 
revenue model - shop sales, online sales, subscription, pay per play, free, 
advertising. 
3. Degree of openness in hardware system – open, mixed, closed. 
4. Characteristics of the software production process – cost, length, team size 
 
Table 3-2 Key Segments of the Digital Games Industry 
Segment 1  
Console 
Games  
Examples of 
Platforms and 
games  
Market 
Concentration 
Revenue Model Openness of 
Hardware System 
Software Production Process 
1A Console/ Video  
 
Final Fantasy on 
PS2,  
Halo on the Xbox,  
Donkey Kong on 
the Gamecube 
Hardware 
oligopoly 
 
 
Sony, Microsoft, 
Nintendo 
 
Hardware developed as a loss leader and 
money made on sales of software. 
 
Games sold on CD through shops. Premium 
retail price. 
 
Many games now adding online and 
multiplayer functionality. 
Closed.  
 
Proprietary and non-
interoperable 
hardware systems. 
Games expensive to develop, little 
follow-up service costs. 
 
Average length of dev. 18 months. 
 
Average team size 12-40 
1B Handheld 
 
Pokemon on GBC, 
GBA, GBASP. 
Also Gamepark, N-
Gage and Zodiac. 
Sony’s PSP 
Nintendo’s DS 
Until recently a 
Nintendo 
Hardware 
Monopoly 
 
New entrants 
Nokia, Tapwave 
and Sony. 
Hardware developed as a loss leader and 
money made by on sales of software. 
 
Games sold on cartridges through shops. 
Premium retail price. 
 
Newer handhelds include multiplayer 
functionality. 
Closed. 
 
Proprietary and non-
interoperable 
hardware systems  
 
 
Games expensive to develop, little 
follow-up service costs. 
 
Average length of dev. 9 months. 
 
Average team size 12-20 
Segment 2 
Stnd PC 
Games 
Examples of 
Platforms and 
games  
Market 
Concentration 
Revenue Model Openness of 
Hardware System 
Software Production Process 
2A Harry Potter and 
the Philosopher’s 
Stone, Quake, 
Black and White, 
Diabhlo II & 
battle.net  
Numerous Games sold on CD through shops.  
 
Many games now adding online 
functionality and downloadable elements. 
Cheaper retail price than segment 1  
Common standards, 
non-proprietary 
technology. 
 
Games less expensive to develop than 
console & handheld. 
 
Average length of dev. 15 months. 
Average team size 12-15 
Segment 3 
Massively 
Multiplayer
Online 
Games 
Examples of 
Platforms and 
games  
 
Market 
Concentration 
Revenue Model Openness of 
Hardware System 
Software Production Process 
 
World of Warcraft 
Blizzard/Vivendi 
Lineage II, NCSoft  
Oligopoly  
EA, Sony, 
Microsoft, 
NCSoft, Vivendi  
Games sold on CD through shops but 
played online.  
 
Consumers pay monthly subscription fee 
Common standards, 
non-proprietary 
technology. 
 
Very expensive to develop and 
significant ongoing costs.6 
and online service charges to a telecoms 
operator. 
Developed mainly for 
PC 
Segment 4 
Mini/ 
Games  
Examples of 
Platforms and 
games  
Market 
Concentration 
Revenue Model Openness of 
Hardware System 
Software Production Process 
4A  Numerous 
players 
including the 
major players in 
other segments 
Advertising used to support free games 
distributed via portals on the internet. 
 
Also pay per play and monthly subscriptions 
Common standards, 
non-proprietary 
technology. 
 
Inexpensive to develop and small 
teams. 
4B Mobile 
 
Snake, Frogger,  
Numerous 
players. 
DoCoMo in 
Japan, Sprint in 
the US, also 
Sega and Sony. 
Games sold online and pay per download 
model  
 
Revenue divided between developer and 
operator.  
A number of 
competing 
proprietary 
technologies 
Inexpensive to develop and small 
teams. 
 
Average length of production 6 weeks - 
3 months. 
4C Digital Television 
 
PlayJam in the UK 
and CableVision in 
the USA. 
Numerous 
players 
Games channels offered as part of a digital 
subscription package.  
 
Advertising an important revenue source as 
is SMS and telephone calls. 
A number of 
competing platforms 
and input devices 
Inexpensive to develop and small 
teams. 
 
 Segment one includes games developed for both handheld and console platforms and 
is clearly the most significant in terms of market share at the moment (see Figure 3-3). 
These two platforms are combined into one segment because of their similarities 
across the different criteria in all but their storage device. This segment is often 
described as an oligopoly with three platform developers involved in both hardware 
and software production: Nintendo, Sony and Microsoft, alongside a relatively small 
number of independent publishers.vii While Nintendo have held a dominant position in 
the handheld market for a number of years there have been a number of new entrants 
recently and Sony launched a competing platform, the PSP, in 2005. While one might 
describe the segment as an oligopoly there is strong competition between the major 
players in this segment and previously dominant market players like Atari and Sega 
have found that having market share is no guarantee that one can keep it (Gallagher 
and Park 2002; Williams 2002).  
 
Segment one is marked by the fact that console games are played on a small number 
of proprietary, closed and non-compatible technological systems which are upgraded 
every four/five years. Hardware lifecycles are a unique characteristic of this segment 
whereby every four to five years the major platforms are upgraded and often changed 
so fundamentally that they impose not only an extra cost on the consumer but also a 
steep learning curve on developers who must strive to produce games which harness 
the particular technological strengths offered. Gallagher and Park (2002) identified six 
distinct generations of console platforms between 1976 and 2002. In each generation 
particular hardware systems usually offer little backward compatibility. In this regard 
Sony’s PlayStation 2 broke with tradition. 
 The oligopolistic nature of this segment combined with the closed technological 
systems has a strong structuring effect on the software production process and means 
that the major platform developers erect a number of barriers in order to protect their 
market share and prevent the entry of competitors. Thus while games can be ‘ported’, 
from one platform to another the main platform developers go to great lengths to 
control the flow and quality of content onto their system and to ensure that non-
licensed software from non-accredited developers will not work on their platforms.  
 
Nintendo, for example, is well known for introducing both a hardware solution, the 
‘lock-out’ chip, and an economic/management solution, high and strictly controlled 
licensing fees, to control the production of console games for its platforms. Indeed, 
across all the platforms in this segment publishers/developers must pay a license fee 
on every game sold to the platform developer, which is estimated to add $7 to $10 to 
the total cost of a console and handheld game. In some cases they must also pay the 
platform developer to manufacture the software. In addition, all the platform 
developers impose stringent quality control, known as Technical Certification 
Requirements (TCRs), on publishers/developers before they will allow a title to be 
released on their platform and sometimes they will want exclusive rights to a title so 
that it will only be available on their platform. These extra fees and barriers help to 
offset the hardware production and marketing costs incurred by the platform 
producers and help to keep the price per unit of each game high. 
 
The core business strategy adopted by the platform manufacturers in the console 
segment are to sell their hardware as a ‘loss leader’ in order to build market share and 
to rely on the sales of software to make their profits (Alvisi, Narduzzo et al. 2003). 
This pricing strategy is similar to that adopted by manufacturers of razors, who sell 
their razors at a loss but make their money back on the sale of razor blades. If the 
platform developer succeeds in building a large installed base then they can make 
generous profits on their software and in turn reduce the cost to the consumer of their 
hardware which should in turn spur sales of software. The relationship between 
hardware and software in all segments of the digital games industry can be defined as 
‘complementary’, but in segment one of the industry the development of competing 
proprietary technology systems means that in order to build market share each system 
must exploit these complementarities and create ‘switching costs’ to stop people 
buying alternative systems and products. Thus while market share is dependent upon 
the sale of consoles, consoles sales are directly related to the number of high quality 
titles available for the console.  
 
Console games are sold at a premium price through specialist and non-specialist shops 
and are generally distributed as CDs, DVDs or cartridges and packaged in boxes or 
jewel cases. While retailers currently constitute an important stage in the value chain 
(see Chapter Four) an interesting development is the growth of console games with 
online functionality which may overtime reduce the role of the retailer in the value 
chain. To date both Sony and Microsoft have launched networks to support online 
multiplayer play - PS2 Network Gaming and Xbox Live – allowing users to play 
against other players online and to download additional game content. The continued 
development of online functionality may ultimately lead to more downloads and less 
high street retail, although a key barrier to this in many markets is the lack of 
broadband availability.  
 Segment Two includes most PC games but not MMOGs. In contrast to segment one 
this segment has a much smaller market share, particularly in Japan and the USA. 
While this might prove a disincentive for some developers, for others, the smaller 
market share is outweighed by the cheaper development costs given that PCs/Macs 
are based on common standards and open architectures. In addition, developers do not 
have to pay a license fee or royalties to the platform manufacturer. These facts are 
reflected in a cheaper retail price than for a console game. The downside of this 
openness is that there is greater competition. Williams (2002) notes that there were 
4,704 PC titles available in 1998 compared to 44 for the Nintendo 64 and 399 for the 
PlayStation. PC games are generally sold as boxed CDs through specialist and non-
specialist retail outlets although many companies release upgrades and patches, i.e. 
software that fixes bugs, online.  
 
Despite the fact that console and PC games have both been developing online 
elements MMOGs are marked by specificities which require classification as a 
separate segment; not least the fact that they are persistent games with ongoing 
production and customer service costs. It is difficult to estimate market share as 
general industry reports do not separate out MMOGs from standard PC games; but 
many reports would recognise the potential of this segment, particularly when one 
examines how things have developed in the Korean market, one of the most highly 
developed broadband networks in the world. At the same time it is important to 
remember that console gaming was banned in Korea until relatively recently and as 
such online PC gaming developed in a rather protected market. Other countries are 
unlikely to follow the same pattern.  
 Segment Three can also be described as an oligopoly as a small number of large 
companies like NCSoft, Vivendi Universal and Sony are involved in the development, 
publishing and distribution of the most successful (in subscription terms) MMOGs 
including Lineage II (2004), World of Warcraft (2004) and Final Fantasy XI Online 
(2002)(Woodcock 2005). However, the main platforms are currently open platform, as 
in segment two, and mainly based on PC and Internet common standards. Developing 
a persistent world requires significant investment not only in initial development but 
also in ongoing costs including maintenance, expansions and community support. 
Kline et al (2003:161) note that Ultima Online (1997) took 2 years to develop, was 
beta tested with 25,000 players, and support staff cost one million dollars annually. 
Industry interviews have suggested initial development costs of approximately €15 
million. Despite a number of high profile game cancellations last year the sector is 
still growing and attracting significant venture capital investment (Shamoon 2005). 
This may have something to do with the fact that while most MMOGs are sold on 
CDs through shops the consumer must also pay a monthly subscription fee of up to 
$15 and ongoing telecommunications charges to persist in the world.  
 
The final segment, segment four, covers the development of mini games for platforms 
such as digital television, mobile phones, PDAs and the Internet. Again overall market 
share and value are difficult to estimate but a recent ESA report estimated that while 
less than 10 percent of games played online were MMOGs, just over 13 percent were 
browser-based mini games and almost 55 percent were puzzle/card based games (ESA 
2004). This segment is embryonic but in general is characterised by shorter 
development cycles and lower production costs than the other segments. There are 
numerous players in this segment and a mixture of open and proprietary technologies. 
Competition is fierce, margins are low and technical interoperability problems 
abound. 
 
In segment four there are a number of revenue models including: pay per download, 
pay-per-play and advertising. For example, most telecom operators offer users access 
to mobile games on a pay-per-play or pay-per-download basis. In most cases 
developers are not paid a cash advance and rely on a share of the revenues generated 
by the game; a share which varies from operator to operator and territory to territory. 
In Japan the i-Mode model adopted by NTT’s DoCoMo is generous and content 
developers may receive up to 90 percent of revenues. In Europe the revenue share 
obtained by developers varies widely from a low of 20 percent to 50 percent. In the 
USA the rate is closer to 80 percent (TerKeurst 2003). Interestingly, some mobile 
developers have indicated in interviews that as mobile handsets improve mobile 
games may start to be sold through specialist and non-specialist shops. 
 
Mini games are also available via the Internet and digital television. Often these 
games are provided free on game portals and the service is supported by advertising 
or people are charged not to play but actually to upload their score onto a leader 
board. Another development is advergaming which is the development of free games 
which are paid for in advance by a client in order to advertise a particular brand, for 
example, the Nokia Game (1999). Advergaming as a concept is sometimes used to 
describe the development of product placement in games as the use of Red Bull power 
ups in Worms 3D (2003) and Judge Dredd:Dredd Vs Death (2003) demonstrates 
(Edge 2004).  
 It is clear from this analysis that the console and the PC segment operate according to 
what Bernard Miège (1989) called the ‘editorial model’ of production whereby the 
publisher finances creative development largely through direct sale to the consumer 
and the main problems are managing creative personnel and the uncertainty of 
demand. Interestingly, segment three appears to be developing a mixed editorial and 
flow model whereby initially there is a need to sell product direct to the consumer but 
in addition there is a need to supply an ongoing support and content service to 
consumers and quality and speed of distribution is key.  
 
- INSERT BREAK OUT BOX HERE - 
 
Case Study: Microsoft. 
 
While the four game segments identified above operate according to quite different dynamics 
some companies operate in more than one segment of the market. Microsoft, for example, 
currently has a presence in all four of the segments.  
 
When Microsoft entered the games industry it developed and published standard PC games 
(Segment two) and one of its biggest hits in this market was Flight Simulator launched in 
1983. With the launch of the Xbox in 2001 Microsoft moved into both hardware 
manufacturing and into the console segment of the market (Segment one). The company 
moved to exploit online play in 2002 with the launch of Xbox Live which allows players of 
console games to access a closed subscription-based service which enables multiplay over 
broadband networks. 
 
Microsoft also publishes the MMOG Asheron’s Call, developed by Turbine Entertainment 
Software Corporation from Boston. In addition, the company has ongoing interests in 
interactive television/WebTV and distributes free web games on The Zone on their online 
service, MSN.  
 
Microsoft’s move into different market segments can be seen as an attempt to broaden the 
company’s portfolio of software products in order to offset market risk and overcome 
uncertainty over future business models and delivery platforms. The company’s move 
upstream into hardware and downstream into online distribution signals the company’s desire 
to control distribution direct to the home and to challenge the market share of Sony and 
Nintendo.  
 
Further sources of information: (Takahashi 2002), www.xbox.com, 
http://www.xboxlivecommunity.com/ 
http://www.microsoft.com/games/ac/,  http://zone.msn.com/en/root/default.htm 
- END BREAK OUT BOX HERE - 
The Production Cycle 
 
One can also analyse the digital games industry in terms of the actors and their role at 
different stages of the production cycle. The core stages in the production of games 
software are design, pre-production, production, publishing, distribution and retail. 
Although these stages vary in duration and type from market segment to market 
segment the procedure is largely similar. Variation does occur in the MMOG segment 
where there is a requirement for ongoing community support and content 
development following retail.  
 
The Spectrum report (2002:9) likens the production cycle in the games industry to the 
film, music and book industries. In all these industries a publisher provides an 
advance to a creative artist and on completion of the work, takes on the role of 
marketing and distributing it. Once costs have been recouped the artist receives a 
percentage of royalties. A similar process takes place in the console and PC segments 
of the digital games industry although ‘the artist’ who develops the game is usually a 
team of people. Further, ‘the artistic’ or production stage is increasingly integrated 
into the publishing stage in the games industry and game ideas today are just as likely 
to originate from the publisher as elsewhere, reflecting what Williams (1981:52) has 
called the ‘corporate professional’ structure of cultural production. Thus while in the 
book and music industries the creative stage remains largely independent from the 
publishing and distribution stages, increasingly in the digital games industry design 
and production is conducted by salaried staff within publishing companies – and, as 
we shall see, in the major global companies the first three functions of the production 
cycle are increasingly vertically integrated and controlled by one company.  
 
There are three types of development company: first party developers or internal 
teams which are fully integrated into a publishing company; second party developers 
who are contracted to create games from concepts developed by a publisher; and third 
party developers, or independent development houses who develop their own projects 
and try to sell them to a publisher. The extent of first, second or third party 
development varies from country to country but one source suggests that today close 
to two thirds of game production is done by first party developers (Williams 2002:47). 
In other words, a majority of games are developed by teams working within, or owned 
by, a publisher.  
 
Publishers regularly get a bad press in the industry trade magazines and websites. 
Horror stories of projects being canned for no particular reason and royalties being 
withheld do nothing to dispel such beliefs.viii However, interviews with people in the 
industry provide an equal number of stories of development companies who lack 
adequate management structures and cannot complete a game on time or within 
budget. Certainly publishers are the bankers of the games industry and since they 
incur all the risk and uncertainties involved in such an investment they adopt an 
aggressive and tough approach to negotiations with, and management of, developers, 
particularly start-up third party developers. At the same time it is often rarely 
understood by start-up developers that publishers fund portfolios of projects across the 
different genre categories and if their portfolio of games in production has enough 
FPS games then no new project in this genre will get funded, no matter how good the 
idea. Further, once a project is funded most publishers play a role in the overall 
management of the production process because they must be able to schedule the 
game into their localisation, testing, manufacturing and marketing pipeline.   
 
During the 1990s, Cornford et al. (2000) found that the global publishing industry 
consolidated around ‘a core of between 10 and 20 major publishers’ including well 
known companies like Electronic Arts, Nintendo, UbiSoft, Infogrames/Atari and 
Take2. At the same time fears that the industry would consolidate even more have not 
been realised and the new trend is towards vertical integration with developers rather 
than merging and acquiring other publishers (DFC Intelligence 2004). Terkeurst notes 
that the top publishers now run ‘round-the clock, round-the-globe production’ with 
development teams recruited or established in different locations based on labour 
costs, specialist skills (for example, racing and FPS), and localisation/marketing 
needs. Many publishers also own their own distribution channels, almost 80 percent 
according to one estimate (Deutsche Bank 2002:26), and so this stage in the cycle is 
often fully controlled by the publisher.  
 
The retail stage of the production cycle is more and more the preserve of large 
supermarkets and specialist chains, particularly in the USA where Wal-Mart and Best 
Buy dominate. In Europe independent retailers still constitute a significant part of the 
retail sector. As the main access point to consumers retailers can significantly 
influence the success of a game through their allocation of shelf space and in-store 
marketing. As supermarkets and specialist chains grow in size they acquire more 
power to negotiate discounts on wholesale products and returns to publishers. 
Retailers often charge publishers market development funds (MDF) to cover the cost 
of posters, end-of-aisle space and other services. They may also force the publisher to 
bear some of the discounting costs associated with games which do not sell well 
(Williams 2002). One source estimates that retailers earn a gross margin of 35-40 
percent on a full price product (Deutsche Bank 2002). While variations on this 
production cycle exist, the majority of games follow these production stages. 
 
The production cycle can also be conceptualised as a value chain whereby at each 
stage of the production cycle companies add value to the core product and contribute 
to the final price paid by the consumer. Figure 3-4 outlines the different players in the 
production cycle and estimates, in the column on the right, how much each player in 
the console value chain adds to the total cost paid by a consumer for a game.  
 Figure 3-4 The Digital Game Value Chain 
 
Source: Deutsche Bank (2002:18) 
 
Key Trends in the Digital Games Industry 
Different industry reports tend to highlight different trends in the digital games 
industry. The Spectrum report (2002) notes that production costs are rapidly 
increasing and that there are an increasing number of platforms. The Deutsche Bank 
report (2002) also singles out the rising production and marketing costs as a 
significant trend, but they also highlight the fact that publishers are consolidating and 
that digital games are increasingly being sold by non-specialist retailers. They foresee 
that next generation ‘convergence’ consoles will provide multiple entertainment 
options. More recent reports again point to increasing consolidation in the industry but 
also the growth of middleware and the growing number of licensed games and sequels 
in the top ten best selling games (Forfás 2004). In the space that remains this chapter 
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will briefly analyse the trend towards consolidation and licensing in the games 
industry and trace these trends back to a key feature of the cultural industries, the high 
risk of failure involved in the production of a cultural product whose success depends 
on highly volatile factors like fashion and individual taste.  
 
Consolidation: vertical, horizontal and diagonal integration 
 
While early histories describe the games industry as a cottage industry with 
individuals able to programme a game in a matter of weeks the reality of the industry 
today is far from this. In the console and MMOG segments we noted that oligopolies 
have emerged whereby a small number of very large companies dominate the market. 
While it is true to say that there is fierce competition between the main players 
(Gallagher and Park 2002; Williams 2002) in the current console lifecycle Sony’s 
installed base of PS2s at over 100 million dwarfs Nintendo’s 8 million and 
Microsoft’s 6 million. This generation of consoles might be called the ‘Age of Sony’ 
were it not for Nintendo’s success in the handheld sub-segment with the GBA and no-
one’s willingness to underestimate Microsoft. History has shown us that the market 
leaders in one generation will not automatically become the leaders of the next.  
 
An analysis of trends in the digital games industry across all the market segments 
finds that the dominant business strategy is vertical integration up and down the 
production cycle alongside a degree of horizontal and diagonal integration as 
companies attempt to expand into different market segments. The imperative behind 
these forms of integration is the need to exploit ‘economies of scale’ and ‘scope’, to 
maximise global sales and to control distribution. These trends are not unique to the 
digital games industry as Hesmondhlagh (2002) points out in relation to other cultural 
industries in general, and the experience of Disney in particular. What is of interest 
from a political economy perspective is the impact that these business strategies are 
having on the ability of new players to enter the market, on the diversity of products 
produced and on the costs of products to the consumer.  
 
We have already seen that the main platform developers, like Microsoft, operate 
across all stages of the production cycle and are investigating moves into retail 
through subscriptions services, pay-per-play and downloads. We have also seen how 
the current organisation of production means that the supply of console games is 
strictly controlled by the platform manufacturer and the procedures they have put in 
place meant that console games are sold at a premium price through specialist shops. 
These business strategies have already come under scrutiny by national and supra-
national organisations for their anti-competitive tendencies. Sheff (1993) details a 
number of instances when Nintendo was taken to court in the USA for anti-
competitive practices and currently the European Commission, under pressure from 
the International Software Federation (ISFE), is investigating whether or not Sony has 
placed a limit on the numbers of games it will publish on its platforms and if this 
contravenes competition law.  
 
The dominance of the platform developers/publishers in the console segment and the 
fact that reproduction costs of games are relatively low have encouraged other 
companies to adopt business strategies aimed at maximising economies of scale. The 
past decade has seen many third party developers go out of business and those who 
remain have attempted to increase the scale of their operations and/or integrate both 
upstream and downstream (Cornford, Naylor et al. 2000; Pham 2001; Kerr and Flynn 
2003). Publishers, in particular, have been forced to increase in scale in order to 
maintain some control in the production cycle vis-à-vis the platform manufacturers 
and increasingly large retailers. They have done so by buying each other, acquiring 
distribution channels and buying into, or taking over, development studios. Ownership 
of development brings two benefits: a means of maintaining control over production 
and deadlines (Cornford, Naylor et al. 2000) and a means of retaining more of the 
revenue from game sales. Publishers may also acquire development studios in order to 
gain access to intellectual property, for example, the purchase by Infogrames of Shiny 
Entertainment for $47 million in 2002 to obtain exclusive publishing rights to The 
Matrix film license.  
 
Interestingly, and despite the dominant trend towards consolidation, there is still some 
evidence to suggest that there is also a countervailing tendency, at least with regard to 
development studios. A number of cases have arisen where publishers or platform 
developers have bought development companies only for the core of that development 
team to leave to start a new company because they feel that their creativity was being 
compromised in the larger corporate structure (Cornford, Naylor et al. 2000; CESA 
2002; Edge 2003; Edge 2003). A well known example of this occurred when Black 
and White designer Peter Molyneux famously left his company Bullfrog when it was 
bought by EA and founded a new company called Lionhead Studios.  
 
Scale alone is often insufficient to offset the risk and costs involved in developing a 
cultural product and analysis of the games industry also finds that many companies 
are exploiting what is known as ‘economies of scope’. Doyle (2002:14) defines 
economies of scope as ‘economies achieved through multi-product production’ or 
variations on existing products. Economies of scope are a fundamental means by 
which the media industries more generally, and publishers in particular, reduce 
uncertainty of demand. We have noted that production costs have been steadily rising 
in the digital games industry across all the segments while at the same time only a 
small number of games make a profit. As a result publishers tend to develop a broad 
catalogue or portfolio of titles across genres and platforms in order to ensure they 
have at least one successful title. They also tend to develop sequels to games and 
where possible to reuse core technologies. This strategy is found less in development 
studios, which tend to specialise in the production of particular genres of games, but 
even here we find the development of ‘super-developers’ in the US and the UK 
comprised of four or five different teams working simultaneously on different 
projects. Economies of scope are thus fundamentally linked to economies of scale 
given that one needs scale in order to distribute a wide range of products to the largest 
market possible. 
 
 
 
 
Licensing  
 
A further trend which seems to be accelerating in the digital games industry and is 
certainly exercising many speakers at international games conferences is the 
increasing use of licenses. A license gives the owner the right to use a certain 
intellectual property (IP) in certain ways in their game. While initially licenses were 
very limited and games might only use the licensed IP in the packaging and marketing 
of a game, increasingly licenses include the rights to use the voice and likeness of the 
main characters in a game, and in some cases the production of a game may proceed 
alongside the production of, for example, the film, whose license it will use. This 
occurred in the case of the Enter the Matrix (2003) game. 
 
Licensing is a strategy which publishers and developers use to overcome the 
uncertainty of demand for games because of, what film historian Thomas Schatz has 
called, their ‘pre-sold’ properties (Schatz 1993).  Kline et al. (2003) note that drawing 
on pre-existing IP reduces marketing costs because the most expensive element, 
building awareness, has already been done. From real world properties like, David 
Beckham or Tony Hawk, to television properties, like Starsky and Hutch, to film 
properties like The Matrix it would appear that licensing is becoming more 
ubiquitous. Sports licenses are also an important feature of sports games, adding 
considerably to their perceived realism and sales. Screen Digest found that in 2000 
‘licence-based titles accounted for 45 per cent of all-formats in the UK top 100, up 
from 28 per cent in 1997 and 42.5 percent in 1999 (Screen Digest 2001).’ Table 3-3 
would suggest that the trend is continuing, particularly in the console segment.  
 
Table 3-3 Top 10 selling console games in the US Jan.- June 2003 
Title Publisher Developer Developer 
Type 
Licensed IP Sequel 
Zelda:Wind 
Maker 
Nintendo Nintendo In-house No Sequel 
Enter the 
Matrix 
Atari Shiny In-house Yes New 
The 
Getaway 
Sony SoHo In-house No New 
GTA: Vice 
City 
Take 2 Rockstar 
North 
In-house No Sequel 
The Sims EA Maxis In-house No Sequel 
NBA Street 
Vol. 2 
EA EA In-house Yes Sequel 
Def Jam EA AKI Corp Independent/ Yes New 
Vendetta third party 
Tom 
Clancy: 
Splinter 
Cell 
Ubi Soft Ubi Soft In-house Yes New 
SOCOM Sony Zipper Independent/ 
third party 
No New 
Dragon 
Ball Z 
Bandai Bandai In-house Yes Sequel 
Source: Forfás (2004). 
 
Four things stand out in the above table. Firstly, half the games are based on licenses 
and only two of the new titles are non licensed IP. Secondly, only two of the 
developers are third party developers. Thirdly, half of the titles are sequels. Finally, of 
the top ten selling console games in the USA in the first six months of 2003 only one, 
SOCOM, was based on original IP and developed by a third party developer.  
 
One argument which could be made here is that increased cross-media licensing helps 
to increase sales and broaden the market by providing themes, narratives and 
characters that non gamers are already aware of. Certainly, both developers and 
publishers currently feel that the addition of a license increases their chances of firstly 
getting a publishing deal and secondly, reaching a large enough market to make a 
profit. A political economy perspective however suggests that the increasing 
interdependence between media products in different media industries may lead to a 
reduction in the overall diversity of texts and the scope for radical innovation to 
emerge (Wasko 1994). It would also suggest that the growth of licenses, combined 
with consolidation in the digital games industry is making it increasingly difficult for 
new entrants and independent developers to operate (Kerr 2003; Kerr 2003; Kerr and 
Flynn 2003). Given that only one of the top ten selling games in the console segment 
of the market in the US in 2003 was developed by a third party developer, and this 
was based on licensed IP (Kingdom Hearts (2002) developed by SquareSoft), the 
signs are not good.  
 
In summary, it is clear from the arguments and data presented in this chapter that the 
digital games industry is now an important part of the wider cultural industries. 
Looking beyond the data it is clear that the industry is far from uniform and one finds 
a number of competing technologies and business models, and while the console 
segment currently dominates in terms of sales, MMOG and mini games provide 
interesting alternative business opportunities. In addition, markets are far from 
uniform with, for example, sales of console games dominant in Japan and the US 
while online PC games and MMOGs dominate in Korea.  
 
As the industry matures companies in the digital games industry are adopting a range 
of business strategies to reduce their investment risk and increase their returns. These 
strategies have much in common with the strategies adopted in more traditional 
cultural industries. In this chapter we have focussed on just two: increasing 
consolidation and the increasing use of licenses. Both these trends suggest that there is 
decreasing space for small and/or independent publishers and developers, and 
consequently, fewer opportunities for original game ideas to make it to the market 
place, especially in the console segment of the market. Political economic analyses of 
older media industries would suggest that these two trends are linked and that 
increasing concentration will over time lead to less diversity in terms of the range of 
content available. Notwithstanding the appearance of some original titles, when one 
examines the top selling games across all platforms this suggestion appears to have 
some resonance.  
 Finally, it is worth noting that while the digital games industry has professionalized 
and many of the companies have grown into global companies, there is a constant 
need for innovation, creativity and new games. Even after an intense period of vertical 
integration and large scale licensing there is still recognition within the industry that 
third party developers or small scale independent operations could produce the next 
Half-Life or GTA. In this regard one cannot ignore the contribution of modding groups 
and fans and companies like Valve and Maxis have been keen to foster relationships 
with their fans (Postigo 2003). A weakness with much political economic work to 
date is that it focuses on the formal market while tending to ignore the work of 
academics, artists and user/fan groups which operate on the fringes of the market. 
While the goods that these groups produce may not be formally bought and sold they 
may nevertheless contribute to overall innovation and the diversity in the industry. 
This aspect of the games business will be examined in more detail in Chapter Five. 
 
In summary, in this chapter we established that the digital games industry displays 
many of the characteristics of more established cultural industries and while growing 
in economic terms it is still less significant than industries like television, recorded 
music and DVD sales. The chapter noted that the industry is internally diverse with 
the console and PC segments operating somewhat like the book publishing industry 
and the MMOG segment operating more like the broadcasting industry. Finally, we 
noted that the increasing concentration in the console segment coupled with the 
erection of high barriers to entry was resulting in less original console games, more 
licensing and more sequels.  
 
                                                  
1
 The ESA was formerly known as the Interactive Digital Software Association (IDSA). 
2
 Total number surveyed = 1,013. Different numbers of people responded to each leisure activity.  
3
 Unfortunately television and VHS were not included in the CESA survey.  
4
 This segmentation could be extended to include arcade games. While this has not been a core focus of 
my own work, and is almost totally ignored by most industry reports, it remains a significant revenue 
stream for companies like Sega, Capcom and Namco and an important source of IP for budget 
‘nostalgia’ games and mini games. 
5
 Indeed one possible implication of Microsoft’s XNA development platform will be that players will 
be able to play some types of games across platforms regardless of the platform.  
6One source estimate that EverQuest costs $10 million annually to run 
http://www.gamespy.com/amdmmog/week3/  
vii
 An oligopoly occurs when a market is dominated by few large suppliers.  
viii
 One industry source told me that almost 70 percent of funded projects get canned at some stage 
during the production process. 
